Vlastimir Vuković
The perception of people about their money and digital euro
CBM Research Paper 8, January 2024

(full PDF version)

‘At the heart of the confusion about the digital euro was the fact that neither the general public nor the tech-savvy participants could see the difference from what already exists.’ Kantar Public, March 2022

‘At the heart of the confusion about the digital euro was the fact that neither the general public nor the tech-savvy participants could see the difference from what already exists.’ Kantar Public, March 2022

Abstract

In the early 2020s, central bankers started to realize that people do not distinguish public and private money, or central bank money and commercial bank money. The widest general public obviously has a perception of money and money issuers that is significantly different from the settings of monetary theory and policy, which has been confirmed by several recent studies and surveys conducted for the needs of central banks. The perception of people about their money will have a decisive influence on the adoption of central bank digital currency (CBDC). Evidence of the true power of this influence is presented in the final part of this paper – Case study: Digital euro adoption. The fate of the new digital currency as a European alternative will be decided by the answer to the question of the general public: why the digital euro?

Key words: perception of money, people attitudes, monetary theory and policy, monetary legislation, central bank money, commercial bank money, CBDC, ECB, digital euro.

Introduction

In the early 2020s, central bankers started to realize that people do not differentiate private and public money (Cunliffe, Bank of England, 2021), that consumers and businesses do not think about whose liability is cash and whose are bank deposits (Brainard, Federal Reserve System, 2022), that most people don’t realize that they often use private sector money to perform everyday payments (Nagel, Deutsche Bundesbank, 2022), and that many citizens aren’t even aware of the distinction between private and central bank money (Krogstrup, Danmarks Nationalbank, 2023). It is obvious that the public has a perception of money and money issuers fundamentally different from the settings of monetary theory and policies.

All studies and surveys conducted in recent years for the account of central banks found a significant discrepancy. This was confirmed by the comprehensive Study of Kantar Public (2022), commissioned by the ECB, which especially focused on public attitudes about money and payments. ‘Unsurprisingly, most did not see a difference between central bank money and commercial bank money’ (Kantar, p. 7).

The practical consequences of diametrical attitudes were examined using the case study method on the example of digital euro adoption. The choice of digital euro for case analysis is motivated by the ambition of the ECB in researching digital central bank money, as well as the heterogeneity of the euro zone, which inevitably disperses perceptions and attitudes about money and payments.

The paper is structured as follows. Perception of people about their money (Section 2), Case study: Digital euro adoption (Section 3), and Conclusion (Section 4).

Perception of people about their money

Consumers’ payment behavior and their attitude towards cash reserves indirectly but clearly point to their attitudes about money. In the euro area, as well as in most developed economies, consumers prefer cards and other cashless methods for payments. ‘Nevertheless, the majority of euro area consumers considered having cash as a payment option to be very important. The perceived key advantages of cash were its anonymity and protection of privacy and the perception that it makes one more aware of one’s own expenses. […] 37% of consumers kept cash reserves at home, outside the wallet or a bank account, up from 34% in 2019’ (ECB, 2022, p. 5).

According to the mentioned key advantages of cash and cards, it can be safely concluded that consumers do not distinguish central bank money and commercial bank money. In the same year, these findings were undoubtedly confirmed by a comprehensive study commissioned by the ECB. ‘Unsurprisingly, most did not see the difference between central bank money and commercial bank money – bot were seen as safe and secure, particularly as amounts up to €100,000 in their bank are protected by public deposit guarantees, something which the vast majority were actually unaware of’ (Kantar Public, 2022, p. 7). According to this study, most participants do not understand what “risk-free” central bank money means (ibid, p. 33). However, the real conclusion is different: people think that all money, in cash and in banks, is risk-free. Obviously, they consider cash, and their money at a bank account as their own assets in the form of the ECB euro.

The available statistical data could help to explain this mystery about people’s perception. ‘Support for the euro remains high with 77% of respondents across the euro area […] A majority of respondents support the euro in all 19 euro-area countries’ (EC, Flash Eurobarometer, 2022, p. 3). It looks like no one from the Euro-Europeans doubt that their euros are issued by the ECB System, because it can be safely claimed that the group that does not support the euro is made up of people who are nostalgic about the abolished national currencies – marks, francs, lira, pesetas, guilders and other symbols of former monetary sovereignty. In other words, it will not occur to anyone that there is a BNP Paribas euro, an ING euro, a UniCredit euro, a Commerzbank euro or an Intesa euro. The existence of such euro would not only be disputed by consumers, but also by all bankers as well. It is not a fact of life, but a chimerical construction of numerous monetary theorists.

This construction is supported by the majority of central bankers. As a reminder, let’s look at one such typical attitude. ‘Most of what we perceive as money is holdings in private bank accounts. This type of money is created by the commercial banks and is called commercial bank money or simply deposits. Commercial bank money is a claim on a bank – and we can see it as the bank owing us cash’ (Armelius et al, p. 2).

It is unlikely that all central bankers and monetary theorists together will ever succeed in convincing even one bank deposit holder that this type of money is created by the commercial banks and is called commercial bank money!! The client of the bank reasons with common sense – how can the bank create my money that I personally paid to it? It is also obvious to him that without deposits, the bank has a problem with lending to clients, regardless of how much it borrows from the central bank and the market. The Fed agrees with the opinion of the majority of the public that deposits are important for banks’ credit activity. ‘Banks currently rely (in large part) on deposits to fund their loans’. (Federal Reserve System, 2022, p. 17).

Finally, let’s look at the public opinion on deposit insurance, liquidity provision for banks and prudential measures. Most people have heard or read something about it and again interpreted it with common sense that in this way the government and the central bank take care of citizens’ money, that is, their own private money. This is precisely where additional trust in all forms of money originates. That’s why it is difficult to sustain the before mentioned statement that the vast majority were actually unaware of this. It is a deep feeling related to experience, which is acquired from the first contacts of a child with the visible forms of money.

Of course, public trust in money primarily depends on its general acceptance as a means of payment. Confidence is strengthened by a small number of bank runs and their quick resolves. All this together strengthens confidence in money. Consequently, for the general public and most individuals, every euro was issued by the ECB (System), every US dollar by the Fed, every pound sterling by the Bank of England, etc., etc.

The public’s “vague” attitudes about their own money and the “blurred” view of money issuers can hardly be corrected by social engineering, even with the Behavioral Insight Unit (BIU), initially set up by the UK Government (Haldane, p. 23). ‘In particular, their work has focused on how sometimes subtle changes in language can be used to improve understanding by the public and to “nudge” them towards a particular course of actions (ibid). However, for a central banker, this is not a common approach, and doing experiments with the general public is a rather daunting task.

In the conclusion of this section, we can highlight the finding that there is a dramatic gap between the perception of people about their money and the standpoint of monetary policy about money. There is no “nudge” that will convince deposit holders that it is not their money, but money that commercial banks have created, that is, issued. The public has not believed in alchemy for a long time, and especially not in monetary alchemy.

Case study: Digital Euro adoption

Why case study?

To test the impact of the perception of people on their money on the eventual introduction of CBDC in one of the developed economies, the example of the digital euro was chosen. Taking monetary union as the most suitable example, as opposed to countries with monetary autonomy, it may seem surprising and unrepresentative. However, the heterogeneity of the euro area with single currency is the reason why attempts to design and adopt a digital euro in the unforeseeable future have many similarities with other CBDC projects. The characteristics of the digital euro and their contribution to the desired adoption will be tested through the prism of the perception of people.

The testing was performed using the case study method due to the many unknowns in terms of strategic goals (currency or platform), desired characteristics (only retail or and wholesale), operational methods (centralized, decentralized or mixed), network (online and offline or only online), authorized intermediaries (banks, payment providers and others) and other dilemmas that make any modeling and more formal research meaningless. There are two additional reasons. ‘First, case studies can help establish the historical and institutional context, an essential first step in good applied work. Second, historical analysis of actual policy experiences is a natural way to find substantive hypotheses that subsequent work can model and test more formally.’ (Bernanke and Mishkin, p. 185).

Definition, objectives, issuers and distributions

The starting point of this analysis are the definition of the digital euro and the goals of its adoption, as well as the indisputable features that the constructors want to incorporate into the new digital currency. These definitions, goals and characteristics are most clearly described in two official documents: European Commission’s Proposal for a regulation […] on the establishment of the digital euro (Proposal) from June 2023 and the ECB’s Progress on the investigation phase of a digital euro – fourth report (Report) from July of same year.

According to the Proposal (Context), the definition is comprehensive: ‘Like cash, a retail CBDC would be an official form of central bank money directly accessible to the general public, endowed with the status of legal tender. It would thus adapt the official forms of the currency to technological development, complementing cash’ (p. 1). This definition contains the key features that policymakers strive for: retail CBDC, directly accessible, official currency, and complement of cash.

Next, a few words about the goal of the digital euro and its issuers. ‘The objective of this proposal is to ensure that central bank money with the status of legal tender remains available to the general public, while offering a state-of-the-art and cost-efficient payment means, ensuring a high level of privacy in digital payments, maintaining financial stability and promoting accessibility and financial inclusion. For this purpose, the proposal establishes the digital euro may be issued by the European Central Bank and national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro, as part of the Eurosystem, […]’ (Proposal, p. 2).

The area of distribution of digital euro and payment service providers are especially emphasized. ‘The proposal builds on the internal market freedom to provide payment services, wherever the payment service provider is incorporated’. The intention is that ‘[…] all EU payment services providers may distribute the digital euro across the euro area’ (ibid, p. 2).

Technical features, charge and approach

In the end, as always, the most interesting are the technical features. ‘Digital euro users will not be required to have a non-digital euro payment account. Some functionalities of the digital euro nevertheless require a non-digital euro payment account. […] The digital euro should be available for digital euro payment transactions both offline and online as of the first issuance of the digital euro and should allow for conditional payment transactions. […] as a digital form of the single currency, it should be fully fungible’ (ibid, p. 14). These “technical features” hide the trigger for tectonic changes in the emission of money and payments. However, this case study is dedicated to the perception of people, not to the analysis of the digital euro design.

Additional clarifications are provided by the already mentioned ECB’s fourth report. ‘The Eurosystem is of the opinion that a digital euro should offer basic services to citizens free of charge, reflecting its status as a public good and in line with users’ experience with cash. […] These free basic services could therefore include: (i) opening/holding closing of a digital euro payment account, (ii) non-automated and automated funding and defunding from a non-digital euro payment account, (iii) waterfall/ reverse waterfall services, (iv) provision of a basic payment instrument, and (v) initiating and receiving payment transactions’ (ibid, p. 1, 6). A summary comparison shows that all services like cash payments will be free, as well as basic non-cash payments services. The direct connection between the two payment accounts – digital and non-digital – has been repeatedly emphasized, although it is unclear how did the bank transaction account become non-digital. We make all digital payments via cards or smart phones precisely thanks to payment accounts, which are digital by definition today?

Within the roll-out approach, the order of implementation is planned. ‘The Eurosystem envisages that a first product release would include person-to-person and e-commerce payments. Focus group research showed that person-to-person payments are highly valued by users across the euro area’ (ibid, p. 10). ‘A second product release would include point-of-sale payments. Implementing payments at physical stores may take longer because it would entail adapting the existing physical infrastructure across Europe’ (p. 11). The proposed sequence of launches is suitable for market and technological challenges, but not for the needs of the public – person-to-person payments should be the priority of all priorities.

The ECB emphasizes that according to the established estimates, there is a sufficient number of innovative payment providers who are interested in business with the digital euro. ‘The research indicated that there is a sufficiently large pool of European providers that are ready to develop digital euro solutions’ (ibid, p. 2). Of course, it is difficult to imagine a payment provider that would risk refusing the distribution of a new digital currency issued by a central bank.

The most important user groups and promotions

At first sight, it can be concluded that the digital euro adoption will significantly depend on the success of its promotion as a complement to cash and the degree of that complementarity. All other types of payment – e-commerce and point-of-sale – are already available to holders of bank payment accounts! Considering the financial exclusion of vulnerable groups and the problems they face in everyday payments, they could be significant beneficiaries of the digital euro and its promoters. Of course, under the condition that it is free and simple and reliable enough for their payments. This author apostrophized this more than two years ago: ‘However, central bank money for public cannot avoid its digital destiny, since the problem of a billion unbanked people all over the world needs a solution’ (Vuković, p. 1). There are also opposing opinions, but they come from researchers closely associated with the banking sector (Mai, 2021; Sigurd et al, 2023).

To avoid financial exclusion, the basic features of money, contained in cash, are sufficient. ‘The key features that a new payment method should have to make it attractive to at least a subsection of the unbanked, underbanked and offliners are being easy to use, secure and free of charge. In essence, it should act like cash as much as possible’ (Kantar Public, 2022, p. 10).

Another significant group of potential users could make the citizens who prefer the security of central bank money. Inevitably, they would face the quantitative limits that the waterfall/reverse waterfall regime of funding and defunding from a non-digital euro payment account imposes on all holders. Future problems with quantitative limits can already be glimpsed from the studies at the national level: ‘We find a clear potential for CBDC: 49% of the public is interested in opening a CBDC current account, and 54% in opening a CBDC savings account. People see the not-for-profit nature of central banks and its potential robustness against disruption as a rationale for central banks to introduce CBDC’ (Bijlsma et al, p. 3).

Quantitative limits are perhaps the most sensitive parts of the adoption of digital euro, which is deprived of one of the three fundamental functions of money – store of value. How to explain to citizens of euro area countries that they can only keep a small, legislatively limited amount of safe public money and an unlimited amount of less safe private money? And both in digital form? The story of the so-called disintermediation in banking will not be moved by people, especially in today’s time of increased interest rates and booming bank profits. And the accounts of the monetary delusions of the past centuries will continue to come due in the form of cyclical banking crises. 

All other groups of potential users and other payment methods are likely to contribute less to digital euro adoption. Similar views are shared by the majority of researchers who have also analyzed the possibilities of implementing the digital euro.

‘Few participants among the general public or the tech-savvy had heard of the digital euro or knew much about it. […] However, once it was explained to them, participants appreciated the difference between the digital euro and cryptocurrencies and liked the fact that it would be backed by the ECB. This is considered an added value in terms of safety, regulation and stability. Some participants worried that the introduction of a digital euro would lead to a phasing out of cash’ (Kantar Public, 2022, p. 7).

The key drivers of adoption

Trust in the central bank, security and resilience are the most often mentioned among the decisive factors for the adoption of the digital euro. At the same time, the majority of respondents in the countries of the euro area point out that they are satisfied with the payment services of banks. Therefore, the question immediately arises: why the digital euro? Why should satisfied users of bank accounts also use the digital euro accounts?

Other factors are cited. ‘With regard to preferred payment methods, common factors cited are convenience, ease of use and wide acceptance. These factors – along with recommendations from friends – were also cited as the key drivers for adapting to a new payment method in the past. […] However, recent rates of adoption of new payment instruments have been low, as most participants felt that existing methods already respond to their needs’ (Kantar Public, p. 16). And again at the end we see expressed satisfaction of the majority of participants with the existing payment methods offered by commercial banks! And again the question: why the digital euro?

The opinion of the representatives of European consumers is a warning for the ECB System and the European Commission. ‘The creation of the digital euro must be to give consumers who choose digital payments to have at their disposal a form of digital public cash. It is why this ranking is determined by the idea that the digital euro will be a payment instrument that the consumer carries with them (bearer instrument) on which the electronic monetary units are stored and not simply based on an account (account-based instrument) that requires an internet connection at the time of the transaction. In this logic, this classification prioritizes the aspects that make the difference between cash and traditional digital payments, i.e., resilience and privacy. The others are important but are not specific to the digital euro’ (BEUC, January 2021, p. 5).

However, the views of citizens of the Netherlands are somewhat different. ‘From those who indicated they would open a CBDC current account (49%), the largest group shoes to transfer EUR 101-500 to this CBDC current account. As only a smaller portion of the respondents willing to open a CBDC current account would transfer nothing or at most EUR 100, it is likely that once people are willing to open a CBDC current account, they would transfer substantial amounts to this account. This indicated that a CBDC current account is not only seen as a nice-to-have, but is something that people would actively use’ (Bijlsma et al, p. 9). The optimistic conclusion that the authors of the study ultimately drew is not valid, because the respondents were not presented with quantitative limits. It is not difficult to guess the winner in the race of unlimited bank debit card and limited CBDC current account.

‘Widespread use of the digital euro as a means of payment is not very likely though, as it will provide no added benefits and will be subject to restrictions’ (Mai, p. 1). However, greater privacy protection may be a pull factor (ibid). Yet, the claim that there are no problems or gaps in the payment system, often repeated in recent years, especially in the U.S., is unfounded and ‘[…] raises the question as to the problems or gaps in the payment system that the digital euro is supposed to solve or close’ (Mai, p. 2). Experience of Sveriges Riksbank is the best testimony to this.

It is about a fundamental problem – non-acceptance of cash payments, which citizens of the euro area also face. ‘Cash payment, the only “European” retail payment option available throughout Europe, is also on the decline. The ECB’s efforts to create the digital euro as a European alternative that could be used throughout the euro area should therefore be welcomed (Mai, p. 4). A complement such as the digital euro is a significant part of the solution to that problem (PoS terminals), but in an uncertain future according to the Proposal (p. 11).

However, the acceptance by citizens will be most affected by the limits of the digital euro holding. Brutal limits, below 3,000 euros, will discourage demand. From experience, administrative restrictions on market supply as a rule cause an increase in demand, which is satisfied by finding alternative solutions.

The banking sector is worried and looking for limits that would discourage citizens from accepting the digital euro. ‘Lower holding limits – including a possible zero holding limit – would likewise reduce the risk of adverse impact on lending interest rates and thus overall economic activity. As an example, setting a holding limit of 500 euro rather than 3,000 euro […]’ (Sigurd et al, p. 11). In comparison, the current limit in the Bahamas and the proposed limit for the UK are 15-20 times higher than the suggested €500! The banks would be the happiest if the digital euro project was abandoned immediately.

Puzzle and confusion

The biggest part of the puzzle and confusion directly stems from the aforementioned conclusion about the dramatic gap between the perception of people about their money and the standpoint of monetary policy about money. Essentially, this gap is the biggest threat to the market survival of the new digital currency. The digital euro is a product of monetary policy, but its market success is determined by the general public acceptance, not by the will of central bankers.

Numerous puzzles are contained in the negative attitudes of the general public about the digital euro, concisely presented in the aforementioned Study. ‘In general, negative and neutral feelings about the digital euro among the general public are based on the fact that participants saw neither a benefit in nor a necessity for its introduction, given the current environment in which people already use electronic methods for many transactions’ (Kantar Public, p. 38).

Particularly intriguing are the negative views about the possible impact of the digital euro on disappearing cash, the elderly, financially excluded groups and privacy. ‘The most frequently mentioned drawback was the idea that the digital euro would mean the end of physical cash. This was a concern for participants on a number of grounds. Many worried about elderly and less technologically literate people. The move to a digital currency was seen by many as a further invasion of privacy, giving banks even more access to their personal data and spending habits. There was a concern that the digital euro could be used as a form of surveillance and control, in contrast to physical cash’ (ibid).

The accumulation of puzzles is inevitably followed by a growing confusion. ‘At the heart of the confusion about the digital euro was the fact that neither the general public nor the tech-savvy participants could see the difference from what already exists. How would this digital euro be different from the money held in bank accounts (which some consider to be digital money) or in banking or financial service apps? The difference between these “cashless euro” and the digital euro was unclear to participants’ (ibid, p. 37).

Section 2 already explained the root of this confusion: people empirically believe that all money, in cash and in banks, is risk-free. Obviously, they consider cash, as and money at a bank account as their assets in the form of ECB Euros. They also correctly see their money at the bank account as digital money, because they know that it is digitally transferable. The distinction between central bank money and commercial bank money is meaningless for the general public, because they consider it all their money. Persistent explaining to the public what this difference is can only additionally endanger the otherwise fragile financial stability and disqualify the digital euro.

The challenges and perspectives

The challenges are extremely large and require maximum consideration of the public’s views on money and their real needs in retail payments. Ignoring these attitudes and needs, as well as focusing on technical features, leads to nothing. Similar ventures in the recent past also require attention, especially the episode with the electronic euro. An instructive example for central banks from the euro area is the failure of electronic money institutions, which today are a peripheral street of the payment system. Central bankers should carefully study the mistakes made by their predecessors in 2010, so that the digital euro does not suffer the fate of the electronic euro, and digital wallets the fate of e-wallets!

Obviously, the perception of people is realistic and sustainable based on the experience and not on various monetary constructions of policymakers. If the designers of the digital euro do not take into consideration the perception of people, or only partially respect it, it will call into question the survival of the new digital currency on the market.

Valuable guidelines for the designers of the digital euro are offered by the Key findings of the study commissioned by the ECB System. ‘[P]articipants were satisfied with their existing methods and rarely have crucial unmet needs. Participants struggled to see the need for a digital euro, what unmet needs this would satisfy, and how it would fit with existing payment methods. Many believed that digital money already exists, as stored by banks in some electronic format, electronic transfers via apps, mobiles or bank transfers. The distinction between money in central banks and commercial banks remained unclear to many in both the tech-savvy and the general public group. Participants tried to relate the digital euro to their understanding of the existing situation, and as a result they failed to see advantages or benefits, or the rationale for a digital euro’ (ibid, p. 38).

Ultimately, the fate of the new digital currency as a European alternative will be decided by the answer to the question: why the digital euro? More precisely, it will depend on the compliance of that answer with the perception and attitudes of people about their money and payments.

Conclusion

Central bankers started to discover in the early 2020s that people do not distinguish between public and private money, that is, central bank money and commercial bank money. The widest general public obviously has a perception of money and money issuers that is significantly different from the prevailing assumptions of monetary theory and politics.

The most important finding of this research is the existence of a dramatic gap between the perception of people about their money and the standpoint of monetary policy about money. People experientially consider cash and money at a bank account as their assets in the form of euros, dollars or pounds, which are equally risk-free. They also correctly see their money at the bank account as digital money, because they know that it is digitally transferable. Because of all this, the distinction between central bank money and commercial bank money is incomprehensible and difficult to explain to the general public. There is no “nudge” that will convince deposit holders that it is not their money, but money that commercial banks create. The public has not believed in alchemy for a long time, and especially not in monetary alchemy.

Case study: Digital euro adoption provided an insight into essential issues of interest to the general public, the biggest challenges and possible perspectives of this large and ambitious undertaking. One of the first conclusions is that digital euro adoption will significantly depend on the success of its promotion as a complement to cash and the degree of that complementarity. Quantitative limits are perhaps the most sensitive part of the adoption of digital euro without the fundamental function of money – store of value. At the same time, the majority of respondents in the countries of the euro area point out that they are satisfied with the payment services of banks, which is why the question of its expediency arises? That is why the fate of the new digital currency as a European alternative will be decided by the answer to the question of the general public: why the digital euro? And people’s perception and attitudes about their money and payments.

Monetary authorities that respect people’s attitudes and design digital money for the public according to them can expect a certain success of their started projects. On the contrary, neglecting the perception of people and their needs in everyday payments leads to the inevitable failure of central banks in CBDC adoption.

First published on https://centralbankmoneyresearch.com/

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